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Christian H. Robertson II*
In the construction industry, commercial general liability (CGL) insur-
ance is the standard policy for managing property damage risks.  Histori-
cally, CGL policies do not cover an insured’s own defective construction
because the insured controls its own work and can reasonably foresee the
damage that may result from defective work.  But what about the defective
work of an insured’s subcontractor?  Practical considerations limit an in-
sured’s effective control of every aspect of a subcontractor’s work, and this
limitation complicates the insured’s ability to foresee future risks.  In 1986,
the increasing involvement of subcontractors led general contractors to in-
sist upon protection from subcontractor work risks in CGL policies.  The
insurance industry agreed upon and created the subcontractor exception.
Insurers, however, have claimed that CGL policies exclude coverage for
any defective work, including the work of a subcontractor.
This Note discusses court decisions rejecting the categorical denial of
coverage for any defective work and how courts have found coverage exists
where a subcontractor’s defective work is beyond the insured’s effective
control and not foreseeable.  Over the past 15 years, 23 state supreme
courts have ruled that CGL policies cover the defective workmanship of an
insured’s subcontractor.  To illustrate the trend toward coverage, the Note
summarizes a recent Ohio appellate court decision as a case study of the
issue.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2008, Ohio Northern University (“ONU”) entered a deal with a
general contractor, Charles Construction Services, Inc. (“Charles Con-
struction”), for the construction of a 57,000 square-foot luxury hotel and
conference center.1  After completion, ONU found water leaks in and
moisture damage to the interior and exterior walls of the property.2  ONU
investigated the leaks and discovered structural defects that required total
removal and replacement of the brick façade.3  In 2012, ONU sued
Charles Construction for, among other things, breach of contract and
sought to recover damages for defective construction.4  Charles Construc-
tion responded by bringing a third-party lawsuit against its subcontractors,
alleging they were responsible for the defective work.5
In 2013, a year into the lawsuit, Charles Construction’s insurer, Cincin-
nati Insurance Company (“Cincinnati Insurance”), entered the case.  Cin-
cinnati Insurance sought a declaratory judgment against Charles
Construction.  Specifically, Cincinnati Insurance asked the court to find
that it did not owe Charles Construction a duty to defend and indemnify it
under the agreed upon commercial general liability (“CGL”) policy.6  In
bringing this claim, Cincinnati Insurance relied on a broad interpretation
of the Ohio Supreme Court’s 2012 ruling in Westfield Ins. Co. v. Custom
Agri Systems, Inc., where the court held:
1. See Ohio N. Univ. v. Charles Constr. Servs., Inc., 2017-Ohio-258, 77 N.E.3d 538, ¶
2 (3d Dist.).
2. See id. ¶ 3.
3. See id.
4. See id. ¶ 4.
5. See id.
6. Id.
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[C]laims of defective construction or workmanship brought by a property
owner are not claims for “property damage” caused by an “occurrence” under
a commercial general liability policy.7
In Ohio N. Univ. v. Charles Constr. Servs., Inc., Charles Construction
and ONU joined and sued to compel Cincinnati Insurance’s coverage.
They sought to distinguish the Custom Agri case by showing that the de-
fective work on its property was the product of the insured’s subcontractor
and not the insured general contractor itself.8  The issue at trial was
whether ONU’s claims against Charles Construction for its subcontractors’
defective construction fell within the insurance policy issued by Cincinnati
Insurance.9  ONU and Charles Construction argued that the Custom Agri
opinion only denies CGL coverage from including an insured’s own defec-
tive work, not that of its subcontractors.10  Against ONU and Charles
Construction’s arguments, the trial court adopted the insurer’s broad in-
terpretation of Custom Agri and granted the insurer’s motion for summary
judgment.11  ONU and Charles Construction appealed the decision.
The Ohio Northern case represents the commonly reoccurring issue be-
tween insurers and contractors: whether CGL insurance covers defective
construction.  Generally speaking, contractors seek coverage for uninten-
tional defective workmanship, while insurers resist insuring “business
risks” within the contractor’s control.12  The debate historically centered
around the insured contractor’s own defective work.  Although experts
like Professor Christopher French advocate for broader coverage for one’s
own faulty workmanship, many state courts remain reluctant to adopt such
an expansive interpretation.13  Courts, however, have begun to recognize
an exception to the traditional rule of categorically denying CGL coverage
for defective workmanship: the subcontractor exception.
This Note addresses the question of whether an insured’s CGL policy
covers defective construction claims when its subcontractors performed
the faulty workmanship.  By analyzing policies and trending judicial inter-
pretations across the country, the Note asserts that courts should presume
coverage, unless the insurer shows that the insured had sufficient control
of the process that resulted in the defective work or that the policy clearly
excludes the specific coverage without exception.  Although the Note
surveys court interpretations on a state-by-state basis, it uses the ongoing
7. See id. ¶ 6 (citing Westfield Ins. Co. v. Custom Agri Systems, Inc., 133 Ohio St.3d





12. See Robert J. Franco, Insurance Coverage for Faulty Workmanship Claims under
Commercial General Liability Policies, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 785 (1994).
13. See generally Christopher C. French, Revisiting Construction Defects as “Occur-
rences” under CGL Insurance Policies, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 101 (2016).
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Ohio Northern case as a current and illustrative case study of the identified
trend.
Split into five parts, this Note begins with the fundamental rules and
concepts of policy interpretation and ends with their application in courts
nationwide.  Part I sets forth the background of CGL policies.  Part II dis-
cusses the canons of insurance policy interpretation applied by courts.
Part III presents the relevant provisions within the standard CGL policy.
Part IV establishes the courts’ traditional denial of CGL coverage for an
insured’s own defective work.  Part V presents the new, majority trend
covering defective work under the subcontractor exception.  The Note
concludes with a suggested model framework for CGL coverage of an in-
sured’s subcontractor’s defective work.
I. CGL BACKGROUND
CGL is a standard insurance policy in the construction industry.14
Seeking coverage for various projects, contractors throughout the country
purchase CGL policies in an attempt to manage the bundle of risks inher-
ent in their work.15  Insurers, however, limit coverage to insurable risks.16
Principally, insurable risks involve fortuitous loss.17  Unlike insurable
risks, CGL policies do not cover risks resulting from poor business judg-
ment, also known as business risks.  One rationale for this distinction
stems from the insurance carrier’s ability to set premiums based on the
statistical probability of fortuitous losses outside of the insured’s control.18
“[T]o have predictable and affordable insurance rates, the insurers’ as-
sumptions of risk are usually limited to those beyond the ‘effective con-
trol’ of the insured.”19  Capturing business risk concerns in CGL policies,
however, has been an ongoing process, refined over many years.  No or-
ganization has set the industry standard to a greater degree than the Insur-
ance Services Office, Inc. (“ISO”).
ISO is an insurance organization “that drafts many standard forms
used by insurers, including the main ISO CGL. . .form.”20  The ISO CGL
form has become the industry standard and, although individual policies
might include technical variations, the primary CGL provisions are largely
the same across the country.21
Originally, the ISO CGL forms excluded business risks from coverage
with broad provisions such as ISO’s 1973 CGL policy provision “(o)”,
14. See generally Lee H. Shidlofsky, Deconstructing CGL Insurance Coverage Issues in
Construction Cases, 9 J. AM. COLL. CONSTR. LAW. 2 (2015).
15. See generally French, supra note 13.
16. See generally Franco, supra note 12.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 786.
20. Shidlofsky, supra note 14, at 75.
21. Id.
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which denied coverage for “property damage to the work performed by or
on behalf of the named insured out of the work or any portion
thereof . . . .”22  This exclusion implicitly included the work of subcontrac-
tors.  ISO, however, revised the business risk exclusions several times after
1973.23  In 1976, ISO established the Broad Form Property Damage En-
dorsement.24  This provision allowed contractors to replace the previous
business risk exclusions like provision (o) by purchasing endorsements
with narrower exceptions—effectively broadening their coverage.25
The last major revision to the ISO CGL form came in 1986.26  This
revision is the most relevant for policy interpretation today.27  According
to many practitioners, the success of the Broad Form Property Damage
Endorsement resulted in the insurance industry’s willingness to expand
coverage in exchange for higher premiums.28  Moreover, because subcon-
tractors became increasingly integral to the construction industry, insured
general contractors sought protection for subcontractor work outside their
effective control.29  This change manifested itself in the subcontractor ex-
ception—a key provision that has broadened coverage for insured con-
tractors and is a central issue in cases like Ohio Northern.30  The provision
reads as follows:
This exclusion does not apply if the damaged work or the work out of which
the damage arises was performed on your behalf by a subcontractor.31
On its face, this provision appears to clearly remove claims of faulty
workmanship caused by a subcontractor from any coverage exclusion.
The history of this provision, however, clearly indicates the intent of poli-
cyholders and of insurers to provide coverage for subcontractor work in
exchange for higher premiums.  This history is not the end of the story.
Context, gained from the rest of the policy and from the unique facts of
each case, is necessary to fully understand the extent of this important
exception.
22. French, supra note 13, at 107 (citing INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., COMMERCIAL GEN-
ERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM, NO. CG 00 01 12 07 (2006)).
23. See Shidlofsky, supra note 14, at 8-9.
24. See French, supra note 13, at 107.
25. See id.
26. See generally id.
27. See generally Franco, supra note 12.
28. 9A LEE R. RUSS ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 129:18 (3d ed. 2005).
29. See generally id.
30. See Ohio N. Univ. v. Charles Constr. Servs., Inc., 2017-Ohio-258, 77 N.E.3d 538
(3d Dist.).
31. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM,
No. CG 00 01 12 07 (2006).
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II. CANONS OF INSURANCE POLICY INTERPRETATION
Insurance policies are contracts by nature.32  Accordingly, canons of
contract construction—to the extent recognized by various jurisdictions—
guide courts’ interpretation of policy provisions.33  Theoretically, insurers
and contractors can bargain for terms within the policy contract.  Practi-
cally speaking, however, insurance policies like CGL are generally form
contracts (ISO CGL standard forms) that are boilerplate or “take it or
leave” contracts.34  As a general rule, courts will start with the expressed
policy language limited to the “four corners” of the policy.35  If—and in
many jurisdictions, only if—the policy fails to define a term and the term is
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the court will look
beyond the four corners of the policy to determine the parties’
intentions.36
A. Interpreting Expressed Terms
1. Intent of the Parties
When interpreting a contract, courts must give effect to the intent of
the parties.37  As a basic principle of contract law, a contract is only en-
forceable if the parties mutually assent to the agreement.  For instance,
under a CGL policy, it is likely that the contractor intends to pay a pre-
mium in exchange for insurance coverage, while the insurer likely intends
to provide insurance to a specific extent.  The extent of the insurer’s intent
to cover is generally reflected by clear language in the policy.  If the lan-
guage is ambiguous, a presiding court must look elsewhere to determine
the parties’ intent.  Nevertheless, effectuating the parties’ intent must al-
ways be the primary objective.38
2. Plain and Ordinary Meaning Principle
To give meaning to the parties’ intent, the courts start with the plain
and ordinary meaning of the policy language.39  Courts should give words
their plain meaning, unless the policy specifically defines the word or con-
text gleaned from a reading of the whole policy gives credence to a differ-
ent interpretation.40  Dictionaries are often an acceptable source for
32. See 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 269.
33. See RUSS ET AL., supra note 28, at § 22:14.
34. See 108 ERIC M. LARSSON, AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 351 § 8 (3d ed. 2009).




39. See ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS & DISPUTES: REPRESENTATION OF IN-
SURANCE COMPANIES & INSUREDS § 6:2 (6th ed. 2017).
40. See id.
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establishing the meaning of word not defined in the policy.41  Dictionaries,
however, are not always reliable sources for ascertaining the parties’
intent.42
Custom might persuade the court to reject adopting a dictionary’s defi-
nition.  For example, when a term of art is apparent from the trade usage,
a court should presume that the parties intended the term to have the
customary meaning within the trade rather than a technical dictionary
meaning.43  Accordingly, when interpreting CGL policy terms, courts
should give its language the meaning expressly defined or commonly un-
derstood in the trade before searching elsewhere for the plain and ordi-
nary meaning.
3. Whole Policy Principle
Context is another necessary element considered in the interpretation
of a policy.  The whole policy principal requires courts to interpret a par-
ticular term in a manner consistent with the whole policy rather than inter-
preting the term in isolation.44  The purpose of the whole policy principle
is to eliminate absurd results—results that would render a provision mean-
ingless or materially alter the provision’s meaning.45
By interpreting terms with the whole policy in mind, courts harmonize
potentially inconsistent provisions.  Insurers generally have greater bar-
gaining power when drafting insurance policy provisions than policyhold-
ers.46  If provisions are truly inconsistent, courts should give priority to
terms whereby bargaining power was relatively closer.  In CGL policies,
41. See, e.g., Founders Ins. Co. v. Munoz, 237 Ill. 2d 424, 436, 930 N.E.2d 999, 1005
(2010) (stating that “[w]here a term in an insurance policy is not defined, we afford that term
its plain, ordinary and popular meaning, i.e., we look to its dictionary definition”); see also
Markel Ins. Co. v. Muzyka, 293 S.W.3d 380, 386-87 (Tex. App. 2009).
42. See Sanders v. Wallace, 884 S.W.2d 300, 303 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1994).
43. See Lakehead Pipe Line Co., Inc. v. American Home Assurance. Co., 981 F. Supp.
1205, 1211 (D. Minn. 1997); see also Omni Berkshire Corp. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 307 F.
Supp. 2d 534, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that “[i]f the language of a contract is ambiguous,
the court may look to extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent. Extrinsic evidence may include
evidence of trade usage . . . when a trade usage is widespread, there is a presumption that the
parties intended its incorporation by implication, unless the contract language negates it”).
44. See Windt, Insurance Claims & Disputes: Representation of Insurance Companies
& Insureds 6th § 6:2 (2017).
45. See Penthouse Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 612
F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that “[w]e can acknowledge that some of the language
of this [d]eductible . . . may be misleading; but only if read in virtual isolation. When the
Deductible is read in its proper context of the policy as a whole, and with the common under-
standing of how deductibles operate in insurance policies, any ambiguity about the effect of
this language on the scope of coverage vanishes”); see also Blum v. 1st Auto & Cas. Ins. Co.,
2010 WI 78, 326 Wis. 2d 729, 786 N.W.2d 78, 83-84 (2010) (finding that an insurance policy
must “be read as a whole” and not “made ambiguous by isolating a small part from the
context of the whole”).
46. See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83
HARV. L. REV. 961, 963 (1970).
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endorsements for broadened coverage should receive superior weight over
standard boilerplate terms.47  One of the reasons for the greater signifi-
cance of endorsements is the higher premium paid for greater coverage
under the compromise in 1986.48  As a result, endorsements and their de-
rivatives incorporated into the standard form—like the subcontractor ex-
ception—should receive greater weight when truly inconsistent with other
provisions.49
B. Looking Beyond the “Four Corners”
1. Contra Proferentem
As previously mentioned, CGL policies, like ISO CGL standard forms,
are generally not negotiated but rather take it or leave contracts.50  Boiler-
plate standard CGL forms are not necessarily a bad thing.  For example,
they facilitate standardization across the industry.51  They do, however,
create a negotiation power disparity between the drafting insurer and the
contractor.  For this reason, courts assume the insurers that drafted the
CGLs had the comparative advantage to define terms without ambiguity.
This principle is known as contra proferentem.
Contra proferentem construes contract ambiguities in the light most
favorable to the non-drafting party, which in the case of CGL insurance
policies, is usually the contractor.52  For insurance policy interpretation, it
“means any ambiguities in the policy language are construed against the
insurers and in favor of coverage.”53  According to Professor Christopher
French, reoccurring litigation of a policy’s terms that concern coverage of
construction defects “suggests the policy language must be ambiguous”;
therefore, courts should apply contra proferentem in favor of contractors.54
Courts, however, rarely deem CGL provisions ambiguous.55  Although
47. See, e.g., Adams v. Explorer Ins. Co., 107 Cal. App. 4th 438, 452 (2d Dist. 2003)
(finding that “[a]n endorsement is an amendment of or modification of an existing policy of
insurance. It is not a separate contract of insurance . . . . Endorsements on an insurance policy
form a part of the insurance contract, and the policy of insurance with the endorsements and
riders thereon must be construed together as a whole”); see also Ayers v. C & D Gen. Con-
tractors, 237 F. Supp. 2d 764, 771 (W.D. Ky. 2002) (holding that “[e]ndorsements affixed to
an insurance policy are to be read with and harmonized with the provisions of the policy; in
the event of any conflict between the endorsement and the policy, the endorsement
prevails . . . . Here, the endorsement does not provide that it applies to one part of the policy.
Rather, it is provided as an endorsement to the ‘Workers Compensation and Employers Lia-
bility Insurance Policy’ ”).
48. See French, supra note 13, at 107.
49. See id.
50. See LARSSON, supra note 34, § 8.
51. See generally Franco, supra note 12.
52. See PLITT, supra note 35, § 21:1, at 21-5.
53. French, supra note 13, at 109.
54. Id. at 110.
55. See generally infra Figures 1-2 and notes 188-91.
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some courts occasionally deem a term ambiguous, they often do so for the
purpose of denying a motion for summary judgment rather than for the
issuance of a final ruling.56 Contra proferentem should, nevertheless,
guide a court’s interpretation of the policy ambiguities.
2. Reasonable Expectations Principle
Like contra proferentem, the reasonable expectations principle
emerged from the onerous boilerplate characteristics of insurance poli-
cies.57  Professor Robert Keeton established this famous principle in re-
sponse to the growing concern that policyholders—like contractors—faced
a comparative disadvantage in not only establishing terms but also in fully
understanding the extent of their coverage.58  Because policyholders are
relatively less insurance-savvy than their industry counterparts, as a policy
matter, courts should limit policy interpretation to the reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties apparent on the policy’s face.59  Likewise, rather than
strictly following technical provisions embedded within the policy that ex-
cludes CGL coverage, courts should honor the reasonable expectations of
coverage that contractors have when they read that “[the] exclusion does
not apply if the damaged work or the work out of which the damage arises
was performed on your behalf by a subcontractor.”60
III. CGL POLICY PROVISIONS
The ISO CGL form, as discussed in Parts I and II, has become the
standard form used by insurers and contractors throughout the construc-
tion industry.61  Although the subcontractor exception provision language
has become largely uniform, its interpretation has not—that is, until
recently.62
Part III presents excerpts of the standard ISO CGL form provisions
relevant to the issue of whether a contract covers an insured’s subcontrac-
tor’s defective work.  CGL language generally establishes coverage
through the following flow: first, the policy covers bodily injury and prop-
erty damage caused by an occurrence—that is, an accident; second, exclu-
sions deny coverage for specific damage or conduct; and third, exceptions
to exclusions restore coverage.63  If an insured’s claim is an occurrence
56. See, e.g., Ohio N. Univ. v. Charles Constr. Servs., Inc., 2017-Ohio-258, 77 N.E.3d
538, ¶ 41 (3d Dist.).
57. See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83
HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970).
58. See generally id.
59. See id.
60. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 31, at 5.
61. See Shidlofsky, supra note 14.
62. See infra Figures 1-2 and notes 188-91.
63. See generally INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 31. (The listed sections are stan-
dard provisions within general CGL form policies. The pertinent parts included identify the
policy’s coverage, its exclusions from coverage, and exceptions to those exclusions.).
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and either (1) not excluded or (2) excluded but restored by an exclusion’s
exception, then the policy should cover it.
The standard CGL policy provides for coverages and definitions, in
pertinent part, as follows:
SECTION I – COVERAGES64
COVERAGE A BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE
LIABILITY
1. Insuring Agreement
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay
as damages because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” to which this
insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the insured
against any “suit” seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty
to defend the insured against any “suit” seeking damages for “bodily in-
jury” or “property damage” to which this insurance does not apply. We
may, at our discretion, investigate any “occurrence” and settle any claim or
“suit” that may result.
b. This insurance applies to “bodily injury” and “property damage” only if:
(1) The “bodily injury” or “property damage” is caused by an “occur-
rence” that takes place in the “coverage territory”;
(2) The “bodily injury” or “property damage” occurs during the policy
period;
* * *
SECTION V – DEFINITIONS
 * * *
13. “Occurrence” means an accident, including continuous or repeated ex-
posure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.
* * *
17. “Property damage” means:
a. Physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of
use of that property. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at
the time of the physical injury that caused it; or
b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All
such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the “occur-
rence” that caused it.
64. Id.
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The majority of disputes over CGL coverage arise from competing in-
terpretations of what constitutes an “occurrence,” a term essentially
means an “accident.”  The first question a court must answer is whether
the bodily injury or property damage resulted from an accidental occur-
rence.  As discussed in Part I, insurers seek to limit coverage to insurable
risks and to exclude business risks.65  The term “accident” arises from the
fundamental insurance principle of fortuity—discussed more in Part IV.66
Although CGL policies generally leave the word “accident” undefined,
most courts define it as an event that is “unexpected or unintended.”67
Regarding the exclusion for losses related to business risks, the stan-
dard CGL policy provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
22. “Your work”:
a. Means:
(1) Work or operations performed by you or on your behalf; and
(2) Materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection with such
work or operations.
b. Includes:
(1) Warranties or representations made at any time with respect to the
fitness, quality, durability, performance or use of “your work”, and
(2) The providing of or failure to provide warnings or instructions.
 * * *
SECTION I, PART 2 – EXCLUSIONS68
This insurance does not apply to:
a. Expected Or Intended Injury
“Bodily injury” or “property damage” expected or intended from the
standpoint of the insured. This exclusion does not apply to “bodily in-
jury” resulting from the use of reasonable force to protect persons or
property.
* * *
j. Damage To Property
“Property damage” to:
65. See Franco, supra note 12.
66. Shidlofsky, supra note 14.
67. See e.g., Westfield Insurance Company v. Custom Agri Systems, Inc., 133 Ohio
St.3d 476, 2012-Ohio-4712, 979 N.E.2d 269, ¶ 13 (defining an accident as an “unexpected and
unintended” consequence).
68. See generally INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 31.
170 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 7:159
(1) Property you own, rent, or occupy, including any costs or ex-
penses incurred by you, or any other person, organization or entity,
for repair, replacement, enhancement, restoration or maintenance
of such property for any reason, including prevention of injury to a
person or damage to another’s property;
(2) Premises you sell, give away or abandon, if the “property dam-
age” arises out of any part of those premises;
(3) Property loaned to you;
(4) Personal property in the care, custody or control of the
insured;
(5) That particular part of real property on which you or any con-
tractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your
behalf are performing operations, if the “property damage” arises
out of those operations; or
(6)  That particular part of any property that must be restored, re-
paired or replaced because “your work” was incorrectly performed
on it.
The second part of Section I, illustrated above, provides the business
risk exclusions incorporated from the pre-1973 ISO CGL form.69  The
theme common to the exclusions centers around effective control.70  This
is apparent in exclusion “(a).”  If a general contractor intends or individu-
ally expects a consequence, it is within her effective control to avoid, and
therefore, it is not an accident.  Exclusions “(j)(5)” and “(j)(6)” have been
highly litigated.71  Exclusion “(j)(5)” is particularly significant to the issue
of covering the work of an insured’s subcontractor.  The language specifi-
cally excludes coverage for the work of an insured’s subcontractor while
working on the job.  It is noteworthy, however, that the drafters wrote the
“(j)(5)” exclusion in the present tense (e.g., “working”) instead of the past
tense used in exclusion “(j)(6)” (e.g., “performed”).  Courts have inter-
preted this distinction to limit the scope of the “(j)(5)” exclusion of sub-
contractor defective work to that which occurs while working on the
project and not that which occurs after completion of the work.72
69. See Franco, supra note 12.
70. See PLITT, supra note 35.
71. Transportation Ins. Co. v. Piedmont Const. Group, LLC., 301 Ga. App. 17, 686
S.E.2d 824 (2009) (finding that determining that particular part of a property upon which the
insured’s subcontractor was working applied only to the room in which he was working at the
time the fire was started, rather than the entire building that was being renovated at the time
of the fire); see also Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. JHP Development, Inc., 557 F.3d 207, 211 (5th
Cir. 2009).
72. See Ohio N. Univ. v. Charles Constr. Servs., Inc., 2017-Ohio-258, 77 N.E.3d 538, ¶
37 (3d Dist.).
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The standard CGL policy provision that follows is of particular
importance:
l. Damage To Your Work73
“Property damage” to “your work” arising out of it or any part of it and
included in the “products-completed operations hazard”. This exclusion
does not apply if the damaged work or the work out of which the damage
arises was performed on your behalf by a subcontractor (emphasis added).
* * *
SECTION V – DEFINITIONS74
* * *
16. “Products-completed operations hazard”:
a. Includes all “bodily injury” and “property damage” occurring away
from premises you own or rent and arising out of “your product” or “your
work” except:
(1) Products that are still in your physical possession; or
(2) Work that has not yet been completed or abandoned. However,
“your work” will be deemed completed at the earliest of the following
times:
(a) When all of the work called for in your contract has been
completed.
(b) When all of the work to be done at the job site has been com-
pleted if your contract calls for work at more than one job site.
(c) When that part of the work done at a job site has been put to
its intended use by any person or organization other than another
contractor or subcontractor working on the same project. Work
that may need service, maintenance, correction, repair or replace-
ment, but which is otherwise complete, will be treated as
completed.
In no part of the modern ISO CGL form is the 1986 endorsement so
apparent as it is in the last sentence of exclusion “(l).” There it states the
following: “This exclusion does not apply if . . . performed on your behalf
by a subcontractor.”75  This provision has become known as the “subcon-
tractor exception.”76  Although courts have historically been reluctant to
73. See INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 31, at 5 (emphasis added).
74. See id.
75. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 31, at 5.
76. See infra Figures 1-2 and notes 188-91.
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give it full effect—research indicates—and this Note argues—that many
courts across the country have overcome that reluctance.77
IV. COURTS DENYING CGL COVERAGE TO INSURED’S OWN
DEFECTIVE WORK
Practitioners and academics have historically focused litigation and de-
bate on the issue of CGL policy coverage of an insured’s own defective
work, placing less focus on the subcontractor exception.78  Like the analy-
sis applied to the subcontractor exception, the threshold question for cov-
erage of an insured’s own defective work remains to be whether the
defective work constitutes an “occurrence” under CGL policies.  Unlike
the subcontractor scenario, however, contractors refute the validity of the
effective control argument and focus on the unintentional and unexpected
nature behind their defective work.79
A. Arguments for Coverage and Professor French’s Critique
Few experts have argued for the expanded coverage of CGL policies to
include coverage of an insured’s own defective work more than Professor
Christopher French.80  In his article, Revisiting Construction Defects as
“Occurrences” under CGL Policies, French claims coverage analysis
should presume that a contractor did not intend or expect the defective
results of his or her work and, instead, should focus more on the business
risk exclusions expressed in the policy.81  Distinct from the subcontractor
exception analysis, French supports his assertion with three arguments: (1)
the subjective standard of an insured’s intent or expectations; (2) the er-
rant citation to the Weedo precedent; and (3) the assumption error under
the “moral hazard” argument.82
To answer the threshold “occurrence” question, the court must deter-
mine whether the defective work was an accident.83  As French claims,
contractors do not intend for their product to be defective.84  On the other
hand, an insurer would likely counter that a contractor should reasonably
expect defective results when his or her execution or the material used is
sub-standard.  Reasonableness, French argues, is irrelevant to the analysis
of accidental defective work.85  Specifically, French points to the language
in ISO CGL Section I, exclusion “(a),” which states that “insurance does
not apply to . . . ‘property damage’ expected or intended from the stand-
77. Id.
78. See French, supra note 13; Shidlofsky, supra note 14.
79. French, supra note 13.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 104.
82. Id.
83. See INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 31, at 14.
84. See French, supra note 13, at 143.
85. See id. at 144.
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point of the insured.”86  The language clearly indicates, as French claims,
that the court should apply a subjective standard in determining whether
the defective work was expected or intended and, therefore, not
accidental.87
Additionally, as French explains, one of the most errant citations
courts use is that of the 1979 case Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc.88  In
Weedo, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the cracks found in con-
crete poured by the subcontractor were not covered under the general
contractor’s CGL policy.89  Because the Weedo court supported its deci-
sion by referencing pre-1973 ISO CGL revision forms and performed no
analysis regarding either property damage or occurrence, French claims
that the holding no longer applies and is erroneous as a citation.90  As
French highlights, moreover, New Jersey  recently completely overturned
Weedo in its 2016 decision, Cypress Point Condominium Ass’n v. Adria
Towers, L.L.C.91  There, the court found that a “your work” exclusion in a
developer’s CGL policy did not preclude coverage of the rain-water dam-
age caused by subcontractor’s faulty workmanship.92  French contends
that the analysis under Weedo—as perpetuated by a minority of states—is
obsolete, as several subsequent revisions to the ISO CGL policy incorpo-
rate new terms.93
Insurers often cite the moral hazard public policy argument as grounds
for denying coverage.  The argument essentially claims that a court’s en-
dorsement of broad coverage of faulty workmanship will create a moral
hazard that removes a contractor’s incentive to perform their work compe-
tently.94  French criticizes the moral hazard position and argues that it
lacks empirical evidence and that it wrongfully assumes contractors have
insufficient incentives to perform well (other than insurance benefits).95
For instance, French notes reputational risks that could arise from poor
quality work as well as simple payment considerations that incentivize
competent work performance, insurance benefits notwithstanding.96  Per-
86. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 31, at 2 (emphasis added).
87. See French, supra note 13, at 115-16 (discussing the majority rule).
88. See e.g., U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 879 (Fla. 2007) (re-
jecting the insurer’s citation of Weedo as persuasive precedent, the Florida Supreme Court
found that the policy covered the insured’s subcontractor’s defective work).
89. See Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788 (N.J. 1979).
90. French, supra note 13, at 119 (citing Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788
(N.J. 1979)).
91. French, supra note 13, at 119-20 (citing Cypress Point Condo. Ass’n v. Adria Tow-
ers, L.L.C., 143 A.3d 273 (N.J. 2016)).
92. See Cypress Point Condo. Ass’n v. Adria Towers, L.L.C., 143 A.3d 273, 289 (N.J.
2016).
93. See French, supra note 13, at 119.
94. Id. at 130 (citing U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc. 979 So. 2d 871, 890 (Fla. 2007)).
95. Id. at 141.
96. Id.
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haps most poignant in his critique of the moral hazard argument is his
recognition of the unappealing nature of the litigation that would have to
ensue before a court found coverage.97  “[E]ven if the contractor were
able to eventually recover from his insurer as a result of litigation, very
few litigants would describe litigation as a pleasant or valuable use of their
time, particularly while they are trying to run a profitable construction
business.”98
French concludes that courts should presume that all faulty workman-
ship—even that of the insured—constitutes an occurrence covered, unless
either the insurer proves otherwise or the policy specifically excludes cov-
erage.99  Although French acknowledges the majority trend (e.g., coverage
for an insured’s subcontractor’s defective work), French’s broader claim
that CGL policies should cover an insured’s own defective work is far less
accepted.100
B. Arguments against Covering One’s Own Defective Work
Professor French’s claim seeking a broad policy interpretation to cover
one’s own defective work relies upon case law in which the contractor is
further removed from the work (e.g., when its subcontractor does the
work).101  Although courts have become more willing to find coverage for
an insured’s subcontractor—as this Note asserts and Professor French ac-
knowledges102—they do so because they can reconcile finding coverage
with the doctrine of fortuity, essential to insurance common law.103  Un-
like the work of an insured’s subcontractor, the insured’s own work is not
fortuitous and is more subject to moral hazard concerns.104
Under insurance law, the doctrine of fortuity limits liability coverage to
fortuitous or accidental events.105  It is inherent to liability coverage that
claims are fortuitous and not intentional.106  The doctrine of fortuity pro-
tects against nefarious claims brought by intentional conduct or business
risks within the control of the insured as discussed in Part I.107  Determin-
ing an insured claimants’ intent behind the property damage arising from
the work has been a highly debated issue.  Although Professor French
claims that coverage analysis need go no further than the subjective intent
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 142-43.
100. See infra Figures 1-2 and notes 188-91.
101. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 306 S.W.3d 69, 74 (Ky. 2010) (find-
ing that the defective work of an insured was not covered because it was not fortuitous);
French, supra note 13.
102. Compare French, supra note 13, with infra Figures 1-2 and notes 188-191.
103. See infra Figures 1-2 and notes 188-91.
104. See Cincinnati Ins. Co., 306 S.W.3d at 74-76.
105. ERIC MILLS HOLMES, HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 116.1B (2d. 2000).
106. Id.
107. See Franco, supra note 12.
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of the insured, courts have extended the analysis to cover what the insured
controls.108  In essence, if the insured has effective control of the work,
then its faulty workmanship is not fortuitous.109
In Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., the Kentucky Su-
preme Court denied an insured homebuilder CGL coverage for property
damage resulting from its own defective construction.110  Central to its de-
cision was its analysis under the doctrine of fortuity.111  To be fortuitous
and receive coverage, the court held that the conduct must be accidental
and beyond the control of the insured.112  Because an insured claimant
will likely always claim that it did not intend the work to be defective, the
analysis must extend to work that it effectively controlled.113  The court
noted, “It is abundantly clear, therefore, that the issue of control is encom-
passed in the fortuity doctrine.”114  The Kentucky Supreme Court found
that the homebuilder’s direct control over the defective work—albeit
mixed with the work of its subcontractor—indicated that the defect was
not accidental and, therefore, not covered.115
Like the doctrine of fortuity, the moral hazard argument remains prob-
lematic when the defective work is the insured’s own.116  The support Pro-
fessor French cites in his counter to the moral hazard argument actually
limits its analysis to cases where the insured’s subcontractor performed the
faulty work, not the insured itself.117  In U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc.,
the Florida Supreme Court rejected the insurer’s moral hazard argument
specifically because insureds cannot effectively control subcontractors at
every step of the process:118
Even if a “moral hazard” argument could be made regarding the contractor’s
own work, the argument is not applicable for the subcontractors’ work . . .
“[I]t is as a practical matter very difficult for the general contractor to control
the quality of the subcontractor work.  Only if the contractor has a supervisor
at the elbow of each subcontractor at all times can quality control be relatively
assured—but this would be prohibitively expensive.”119
While the J.S.U.B. court remained reluctant to reject the moral hazard
argument for an insured’s own defective work, it was convinced that the
108. See French, supra note 13; see also Cincinnati Ins. Co., 306 S.W.3d at 74.
109. See Cincinnati Ins. Co., 306 S.W.3d at 74.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 75–76 (evaluating the applicability of the fortuity doctrine in detail).
112. Id. at 74–76
113. Id.
114. Id. at 76.
115. Id.
116. See generally U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 890 (Fla. 2007)
(“Even if a ‘moral hazard’ argument could be made regarding the contractor’s own work, the
argument is not applicable for the subcontractors’ work.”).
117. Compare French, supra note 13, with J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d at 879.
118. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d at 890.
119. Id.
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practical difficulties an insured has with monitoring every move its subcon-
tractor makes render the moral hazard argument irrelevant in the subcon-
tractor context.120  In cases of an insured’s own defective work, however,
the moral hazard argument still carries weight.121
C. Traditional Broad Interpretation of CGL Coverage and
Ohio’s Custom Agri Decision
Traditionally, defective construction cases limited CGL coverage anal-
ysis to situations where the insured sought coverage for its own faulty
workmanship.122  Some courts broadly concluded that no defective con-
struction claim constituted an “occurrence” necessary to trigger CGL cov-
erage, even though the cases centered around an insured’s own defective
work.123  The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Westfield Ins. Co. v. Cus-
tom Agri Systems, Inc. provides a good example of a court’s broad inter-
pretation of coverage.124
The diversity suit in Custom Agri arose from damages alleged by a
property owner to the steel grain bin that it contracted a general contrac-
tor to build.125  After the property owner withheld payments, the general
contractor filed a third-party complaint against the subcontractor who
constructed the bin, Custom Agri Systems, Inc.126  Custom Agri Systems
then sued its own insurer, Westfield Insurance Co., seeking defense and
indemnification for its work.127  Moving for declaratory judgment, West-
field Insurance claimed that the defective construction claim did not con-
stitute an occurrence under the CGL policy and, alternatively, that the
policy expressly excluded such coverage.128  The federal district court
granted the insurer’s motion because of the policy exclusion rather than
the absence of any occurrence.129  It “assumed that Custom [Agri Sys-
tem’s] policy covered defective construction and went on to find that the
exclusion removed such claims from coverage.”130
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit certified two questions to the Ohio Su-
preme Court because it had not yet decided the extent of CGL coverage
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 306 S.W.3d 69, 74 (Ky. 2010); see
also Westfield Ins. Co., v. Custom Agri Sys., Inc., 133 Ohio St.3d 476, 2012-Ohio-4712, 979
N.E.2d 269.
123. See Cincinnati Ins. Co., 306 S.W.3d at 75; see also Custom Agri Sys., Inc., 133 Ohio
St.3d 476.
124. Custom Agri Sys., Inc., 133 Ohio St.3d 476.
125. Id.
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for defective construction in Ohio.  Accordingly, the Ohio Supreme Court
analyzed the CGL policy under a two-prong test:
(1) Are claims of defective construction/workmanship brought by a property
owner claims for “property damage” caused by an “occurrence” under a com-
mercial general liability policy?
(2) And, if so, does the contractual liability exclusion in the commercial gen-
eral liability policy preclude coverage for claims for defective construction/
workmanship?131
In Westfield Ins. Co. v. Custom Agri Systems, Inc., the Ohio Supreme
Court found that an insured’s own work does not constitute an “occur-
rence” necessary to trigger CGL coverage.  Its analysis focused primarily
on Custom Agri System’s effective control over its defective work.132  It
opined that the defective results of one’s own defective work is not fortui-
tous or accidental because it is a business risk controlled by the insured.133
Ohio law had already distinguished defective construction from conse-
quential damages resulting therefrom in review of CGL policies.  Unlike
consequential damages that are further removed from the contractor’s op-
erations, defective construction in a contractor’s own work is sufficiently
under her control and, therefore, not fortuitous.134  The key questions, ac-
cording to the court, were “whether the contractor controlled the process
leading to the damages and whether the damages were anticipated.”135
Because Custom Agri System’s claim “against which Westfield [was] being
asked to defend and indemnify Custom [Agri System’s] relate[d] to Cus-
tom [Agri System’s] work itself,” the court found that it had sufficient con-
trol over its own work to anticipate claims of defective construction.136
To answer the Sixth Circuit’s first question, the Ohio Supreme Court
broadly stated that claims of faulty workmanship “are not claims for
‘property damage’ caused by an ‘occurrence’ under a [CGL] policy.”137
Having answered the first question, the Ohio Supreme Court declined to
answer the second question concerning the coverage exclusions and excep-
tions in the policy.138
In Justice Paul Pfeifer’s dissenting opinion, he disagreed with the ma-
jority’s sweeping conclusion and stated that it was overly broad.139  Be-
cause there might be cases where defective construction is truly accidental,
131. See Ohio N. Univ. v. Charles Constr. Servs., Inc., 2017-Ohio-258, 77 N.E.3d 538, ¶
37 (3d Dist.) (discussing the certified questions under Custom Agri Sys., Inc., 133 Ohio St.3d
476, ¶ 6).
132. Id.
133. Id. ¶ 10 (citing Heile v. Hermann, 136 Ohio App.3d 351, 354, 736 N.E.2d 566 (5th
Dist. 1999).
134. See id.
135. Id. ¶ 13 (citing Cincinnati Ins. Co., 306 S.W.3d at 87) (emphasis added).
136. Id.
137. Id. ¶ 19.
138. Id.
139. Id. ¶ 35 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
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he cautioned that the majority’s ruling “forecloses too many other poten-
tial cases.”140  One potential case Justice Pfeifer noted is the defective
work of a subcontractor.141  Instead of denying coverage at the threshold
“occurrence” analysis, Justice Pfeifer opined that courts should shift their
focus to the exclusions and exceptions contained within the policy.142  He
contended that it would be absurd to broadly deny coverage for defective
construction when CGL policies expressly exclude or expressly except cer-
tain types of faulty workmanship.143  “[I]t would be nonsensical for the
policy to include such a[n] [exclusionary] provision if [defective construc-
tion] could never be caused by an ‘occurrence’ in the first place.”144
Courts remain reluctant to extend CGL coverage to an insured’s own
defective work.145  Although experts like Professor French have chal-
lenged this traditional convention, courts tend to find an insured’s own
faulty workmanship sufficiently under its control and reasonably antici-
pated to deny it coverage as an “occurrence.”146  As in Custom Agri, some
courts adopt this reasoning but fail to distinguish it from claims of defec-
tive work outside the contractor’s effective control.147  Many other courts,
however, have identified Justice Pfeifer’s potential cases where CGL poli-
cies cover defective construction—arising under the subcontractor
exception.148
V. COURTS DISTINGUISHING COVERAGE FOR INSUREDS’
SUBCONTRACTORS’ DEFECTIVE WORK
A. Courts Honor 1986 Subcontractor Exception Endorsement
Over the past decade, many states have begun to recognize the ISO
CGL policy revision as evidence of the validity of the subcontractor excep-
tion.149  In 2010, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed its precedent deny-
ing coverage for defective construction by finding that a subcontractor’s
140. Id. ¶ 27 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
141. See generally id. ¶ 26 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (citing Greystone Constr., Inc. v. Natl.
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 661 F.3d 1272, 1276 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that “property damage
caused by a subcontractor’s faulty workmanship is an ‘occurrence’ for purposes of a commer-
cial general liability (CGL) insurance policy . . . because damage to property caused by poor
workmanship is generally neither expected nor intended. . . .”)).
142. Id. ¶ 32 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
143. See id.
144. Id. ¶ 34 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (quoting Lee Builders, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co., 281 Kan. 844, 856 (2006)).
145. See, e.g., id. ¶ 30 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
146. Compare French, supra note 13, with Custom Agri Systems, Inc., 133 Ohio St.3d ¶
29.
147. Custom Agri Systems, Inc., 133 Ohio St.3d at 487.
148. See generally id.
149. See generally infra Figure 1.
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faulty installation of windows constituted an occurrence sufficiently cov-
ered by the general contractor’s CGL policy.150
In Sheehan Constr. Co., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., the court re-
counted the five major revisions to the standard form CGL policies dating
back to 1940 and the impact each had on policy interpretation.151  Before
the 1976 revision, the court found that the “on behalf of” language found
in the “your work exclusion” (comparable to today’s “(j)(5)” and “(j)(6)”
exclusions)152 sufficiently excluded the coverage of a subcontractor’s
faulty workmanship.  The court highlighted the general contractors’ grow-
ing dissatisfaction with the policy exclusion stemming from their increased
hiring of subcontractors.153  According to the court, this dissatisfaction re-
sulted in policy endorsements and provisions that explicitly excepted sub-
contractor work from exclusions.154  The industry’s creation of the 1976
Broad Form Property Damage Endorsement and its subsequent 1986 ad-
dition of the subcontractor exception provision in ISO CGL exclusion
“(l)” made significant changes.155  These changes “eliminated the ‘on be-
half of’ language” and “extended to the insured’s completed work when
the damage arose out of work performed by a subcontractor.”156
Having discussed the significant CGL form revisions, the Sheehan
court interpreted the policy history as conferring broad coverage over an
insured’s subcontractor’s work.157  Although an insurer might still deny
coverage when the insured intends or expects its subcontractor’s work to
be defective, “we start with the assumption . . . [that] the resulting dam-
age . . . [was] unforeseeable.”158  Essentially, courts should presume sub-
contractor coverage unless they find that the insured could foresee (e.g.,
they intended or expected) the defective work would result.159  The court
found that this presumption necessarily followed from the 1986 addition of
the subcontractor exception history and from the absurd consequence that
would result from a categorical denial of subcontractor coverage under the
ISO CGL form exclusion “(l).”  Citing Clifford Shapiro’s article, The
Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: New State Supreme Court Decisions Address
Whether an Inadvertent Construction Defect is an “Occurrence” Under
CGL Policies, the court noted:
A court need only ask why the CGL policy includes an exclusion for property
damages to . . . that of [an insured’s] subcontractors to understand that it
would be nonsensical for the policy to include such a provision if this kind of
150. Sheehan Constr. Co., v. Cont’l. Cas., Co., 935 N.E.2d 160 (Ind. 2010).
151. Id. at 163.
152. Commercial Gen. Liab. Coverage, Form No. CG 00 01 12 07 (2006).





158. Id. at 170.
159. Id.
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property damage could never be caused by an “occurrence” in the first
place.160
In other words, concluding that a subcontractor’s defective work never
constitutes an occurrence would render the expressed subcontractor ex-
ception provision meaningless.  Consistent with the whole policy interpre-
tation canon, the Sheehan court’s presumption of subcontractor coverage
harmonizes the “your work” exclusion with the subcontractor exception
provisions.161  Knowing the purpose behind the 1986 revision, the court
held that the CGL policy covered the insured’s subcontractor’s defective
work.162
B. Establishing Occurrence Based on Effective Control and
Lack of Foreseeability
A salient rationale for the creation of the 1986 subcontractor exception
was to insure an aspect of projects that the insured contractor could not
completely control: subcontractor work.163  “General contractors needed
coverage for property damage that arose from the work of their subcon-
tractors, a risk they could not control by the exercise of general supervi-
sion and coordination.”164  Numerous courts have recognized this
displacement of control as a sufficient justification for finding an insured’s
CGL policy coverage for its subcontractor’s work.165
The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in J.S.U.B.—discussed in Part
IV—was one of the first to expressly apply this “control” analysis.166  In
response to a homebuilder’s insurance claim for the property damage that
resulted from its subcontractor, the court interpreted the CGL policy as
providing coverage—the insured could not control every step of its sub-
contractor’s work.167  Because the insured lacked effective control—una-
ble to have a “supervisor at the elbow of each subcontractor at all
times”—the court rejected the claim that the rule against insuring an in-
sured’s defective work should extend to that of its subcontractors.168
In addition to control, claims for a subcontractor’s faulty workmanship
mitigates, if not eliminates, foreseeability concerns that courts encounter
160. Id. at 171 (quoting Clifford J. Shapiro, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: New State
Supreme Court Decisions Address Whether an Inadvertent Construction Defect is an “Occur-
rence” Under CGL Policies, 25 CONSTR. LAW., Summer 2005, at 9, 12).
161. See generally Sheehan Constr. Co., 935 N.E.2d at 163.
162. Id. at 172.
163. See James Duffy O’Connor, What Every Court Should Know About Insurance
Coverage for Defective Construction, 5 J. AM. C. CONSTR. L., no. 1.
164. Id. at 5.
165. See infra Figures 1–2 and notes 187–89.
166. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d at 879.
167. Id.
168. See id.
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when interpreting CGL coverage.169  In Cherrington v. Erie Ins. Prop. and
Cas. Co., the West Virginia Supreme Court held that a CGL policy cov-
ered the defective work of an insured’s subcontractor because it could not
be expected or be foreseen.170  The Cherrington court seemingly created a
presumption that an insured would neither expect nor foresee the faulty
workmanship of its subcontractor without contradictory evidence.171  The
court stated:
Common sense dictates that had [the insured] expected or foreseen the alleg-
edly shoddy workmanship its subcontractors were destined to perform, [the
insured] would not have hired them in the first place. Nor can it be said that
[the insured] deliberately intended or even desired the deleterious conse-
quences that were occasioned by its subcontractors’ substandard craftsman-
ship. To find otherwise would suggest that [the insured] deliberately sabotaged
the very same construction project it worked so diligently to obtain at the risk
of jeopardizing its professional name and business reputation in the
process.172
The state supreme court opinions of J.S.U.B. and Cherrington capture
the unique traits required by the subcontractor exception that distinguish
cases covered by it from general claims for an insured’s own work: control
and the lack of foreseeability.173  These traits directly answer the “key is-
sues” articulated by the supreme courts of Kentucky and Ohio: whether
the contractor controlled the process leading to the damages and whether
the damages were anticipated.174  Accordingly, courts across the country
have begun to find that CGL policies cover defective subcontractor work
that may have been beyond the control of, and unforeseen by, insureds.175
C. Distinguishing Precedent and Extending Coverage
Over the past fifteen years, state supreme courts have increasingly re-
versed or clarified prior decisions rejecting or limiting CGL coverage for
subcontractor work.176  The Iowa Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Nat’l
Sur. Corp. v. Westlake Inv., LLC—overturning its previous denied cover-
age opinion—illustrates this trend.  The Westlake court grappled with the
issue of CGL coverage for water and moisture damage to a developer’s
apartment complex caused by the insured’s subcontractors.177  In addition




172. Cherrington, 231 W.Va. at 482.
173. Id.; J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d at 890.
174. See Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 306 S.W.3d 69, 74 (Ky. 2010);
Westfield Ins. Co., v. Custom Agri Sys., Inc., 133 Ohio St.3d 476, 2012-Ohio-4712, 979 N.E.2d
269, ¶ 32.
175. See infra Figure 1 and notes 188-89.
176. Id.
177. Nat’l Sur. Corp. v. Westlake Inv., LLC, 880 N.W.2d 724, 742 (Iowa 2016).
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to the standard dispute over the policy’s definition of “occurrence,” the
court had to decide whether the definitions provided in the jury instruc-
tions were proper.178  Among the jury instructions in question, a sentence
in instruction number 21 was of particular significance:
Defective construction performed by an insured is not covered by the policy;
however, defective construction work performed by subcontractors may be an
“occurrence” under the policy.179
After the court provided the jury with the instruction 21, it returned a
verdict supporting the insured’s claim for CGL coverage.180  The insurer
appealed pursuant to the then-controlling Iowa precedent under Pursell
Construction v. Hawkeye-Security Insurance, which broadly stated that
CGL policies do not cover faulty workmanship.181  After the court of ap-
peals affirmed the trial court’s verdict and post-trial rulings, the case went
to the Iowa Supreme Court.182
The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the CGL policy did not
preclude coverage for defective work performed by an insured’s subcon-
tractor.183  It distinguished its decision in Pursell from the Westlake deci-
sion by pointing out that the claim in the former was for the insured’s own
defective work.184  Unlike Pursell, the insured’s claim in Westlake sought
coverage for the faulty workmanship performed by its subcontractors.185
Inherent in the distinction, the court noted, is the element of control.186
Since general contractors lack effective control over all aspects of the sub-
contractor’s work, losses they incur from a subcontractor’s defective work
are more fortuitous than losses from their own work.187  Coupled with the
subcontractor exception under ISO CGL exclusion “(l),” the Westlake
court distinguished the Pursell precedent and concluded:
[W]e interpret the insuring agreement in the modern standard-form CGL pol-
icy as providing coverage for property damage arising out of defective work
performed by an insured’s subcontractor unless the resulting property damage
is specifically precluded from coverage by an exclusion or endorsement.188
Cases like Westlake exemplify the trend towards coverage under the
subcontractor exception and provide a blueprint for state supreme courts
178. Id. at 728.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 736-37 (citing Pursell Construction v. Hawkeye-Security Insurance, 596
N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1999)).
182. Id. at 730.
183. Id. at 744.
184. Id. at 737 (citing Pursell Constr. v. Hawkeye-Sec. Ins., 596 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1999)
(emphasis added)).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 741.
187. See id.
188. Id. at 740.
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(e.g., Kentucky and Ohio) to distinguish cases dealing with subcontractor
work from precedents broadly denying coverage for any defective work.
D. Trending Coverage for the Subcontractor Exception
Like Westlake, many other state supreme courts and legislatures have
adopted the trend of finding CGL coverage for the defective work of an
insured’s subcontractor.189  As of May 2017, twenty-three state supreme
courts found coverage under the subcontractor exception while only four
expressly rejected it.190  Figure 1 illustrates which state supreme courts
have found coverage to apply, those which have not, and those that have
yet to directly decide the issue.191  Figure 2 adds the two state legislatures
that promulgated statutes expressly providing coverage—without subse-
quent state court analysis denying the subcontractor exception192—under
the subcontractor exception.193  Figure 2 also depicts the five federal court
decisions—interpreting state law—that found coverage for insured’s sub-
contractor’s faulty workmanship.194
FIGURE 1.195,196
State Supreme Court Precedents Finding Coverage for
Subcontractor Defective Construction
189. See infra Figure 1 and notes 188-89.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See Columbia Ins. Group., Inc. v. Cenark Project Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 491 S.W.3d
135, 145 (Ark. 2016) (Danielson, J., dissenting) (interpreting Ark. Code Ann. § 23-79-155(a)
as not requiring coverage for subcontractor defective work).
193. See Figure 2 and notes 190-91.
194. Id.
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195. Twenty-three state supreme courts have distinguished the “your-work” exclusion
from subcontractor defective work. See Town & Country Prop., LLC v. Amerisure Ins. Co.,
111 So.3d 699, 710 (Ala. 2011) (finding that in CGL insurance policies with a ‘your-work’
exclusion and a ‘subcontractor exception’, an insured contractor is not covered for property
damage while coverage is restored for the subcontractor); Fejes v. Alaska Ins., 984 P.2d 519,
522-23 (Alaska 1999) (finding that exclusions to broad form endorsement did not preclude
coverage for losses caused by the insured contractor’s subcontractors); Capstone Bldg. Corp.
v. Am. Motorists Ins., 67 A.3d 961, 981 (Conn. 2013) (finding that an insurance policy ex-
cludes coverage for property damage caused by an insured contractor’s work, not by a sub-
contractor’s defective work); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So.2d 871, 888 (Fla. 2007)
(finding that a “subcontractors’ defective soil preparation, which general contractor did not
intend or expect, was an occurrence under CGL policy”); Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. v.
Hathaway Dev. Co., 707 S.E.2d 369, 372 (Ga. 2011) (finding that a “[p]lumbing subcontrac-
tor’s acts of faulty workmanship on three projects, which caused damage to neighboring
property being built by the general contractor, constituted ‘occurrences,’ within meaning of
subcontractor’s CGL insurance policy”); Sentinel Ins. v. First Ins. Co. of Haw., 875 P.2d 894,
904 (Haw. 1994) (finding that a subcontractor’s defects may be covered by a CGL policy);
Sheehan Constr. Co., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 935 N.E.2d 160, 160-61 (Ind. 2010) (find-
ing that a “contractor’s CGL policies could provide coverage for subcontractors’ faulty work-
manship”); Nat’l Sur. Corp. v. Westlake Inv., LLC, 880 N.W.2d 724, 744 (Iowa 2016) (finding
that “defective workmanship by an insured’s subcontractor may constitute an ‘occurrence’
covered by a modern standard-form CGL policy”); Lee Builders, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins., 137 P.3d 486, 493 (Kan. 2006) (holding that unforeseen and unintended resulting from
an insured’s subcontractor work was caused by an occurrence); Wanzek Const., Inc. v.
Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 679 N.W.2d 322, 325-27 (Minn. 2004) (finding that the exclusion for
damage to ‘your work’ within a CGL contract is inapplicable if a subcontractor performed
the work on behalf of an insured general contractor); Architex Ass’n v. Scottsdale Ins., 27 So.
3d 1148, 1162 (Miss. 2010) (finding that “[u]nder [the] CGL policy, the term ‘occurrence’
cannot be construed in such a manner as to preclude coverage for unexpected or unintended
‘property damage’ resulting from work ‘performed on [Architex’s] behalf by a subcontrac-
tor”); Revelation Indus., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 206 P.3d 919, 922 (Mont. 2009)
(finding that “the policy provides coverage for this subcontractor-caused damage” where the
insured knew that the product was manufactured by the sub-contractor); Auto-Owners Ins. v.
Home Pride Cos., 684 N.W.2d 571, 578 (Neb. 2004) (finding that “although a standard CGL
policy does not provide coverage for faulty workmanship that damages only the resulting
work product, if faulty workmanship causes bodily injury or property damage to something
other than the insured’s work product, an unintended and unexpected event has occurred,
and coverage exists”); McKellar Dev. v. N. Ins., 837 P.2d 858, 860 (Nev. 1992) (finding that
“the elimination of the [BFPD completed operations hazard] phrase ‘or on behalf of’ indi-
cates that the work of subcontractors was intended to be covered by the policies”); Concord
Gen. Mut. Ins. v. Green & Co. Bldg. and Dev. Corp., 8 A.3d 24 (N.H. 2010) (distinguishing a
contractor’s claim for CGL coverage of its own defective construction from the CGL cover-
age where the insured’s subcontractor performed the defective construction) (citing Essex
Ins. Co. v. Holder, 261 S.W.3d 456 (2008)); Cypress Point Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Adria Towers,
LLC., 143 A.3d 273 (N.J. 2016) (finding that damage caused by subcontractor’s faulty work-
manship was covered under developer’s CGL policy under the ‘your work’ umbrella); K&L
Homes, Inc. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 829 N.W. 2d 724, 726 (N.D. 2013) (finding that the term
‘occurrence’ in the contractor’s CGL policy covers the subcontractor’s faulty workmanship);
Auto Owners Ins. Co., Inc., v. Newman, 684 S.E.2d 541, 542 (S.C. 2009) (finding that a policy
exclusion effectively barred coverage for damage to the defective workmanship itself, prohib-
iting recovery for the incidental cost of replacing the defective work); Corner Constr. Co. v.
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 638 N.W.2d 887, 888 (S.D. 2002) (finding that the CGL policy did not
exclude coverage for a general contractor’s liability for property damage; subcontractor’s
faulty workmanship was an ‘accident’ resulting in property damage); Lamar Homes, Inc. v.
Mid–Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. 2007) (finding that the subcontractor excep-
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FIGURE 2.197
State Supreme and Federal Court Precedents and State Statutes Providing Coverage for
Subcontractor Defective Construction
tion preserves coverage that the ‘your-work’ exclusion would otherwise negate under a CGL
policy, in this case when a general contractor becomes liable for damage done by a subcon-
tractor); Cherrington, 745 S.E.2d at 524 (finding that the CGL provision excluding coverage
for the insured contractor’s own work did not exclude coverage for damage in the course of
the insured’s subcontractors work); Family Mut. Ins.  v. Am. Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65, 70-71
(Wis. 2004) (finding that if ‘the work out of which the damage [arose] was performed by a
subcontractor, the subcontractor exception restored coverage). See also Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 431:1-217 (declaring that “the meaning of the term ‘occurrence’ shall be construed in accor-
dance with the law as it existed at the time that the insurance policy was issued”).
196. Four state supreme courts have not distinguished the defective work of a subcon-
tractor from the insured general contractor. See Essex Ins. v. Holder, 261 S.W.3d 456, 459
(2008) (citing Nabholz Constr. Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 354 F. Supp. 2d 917 (E.D.
Ark. 2005) (CGL coverage was denied for a contractor’s defective work) (citing Arkansas
appellate court explanation that a contractor might have elected to purchase a performance
bond to protect it from a known business risk that its subcontractor would not perform its
contractual duties”); Double AA Builders, Ltd. v. Preferred Contractors Ins. Co., 386 P.3d
1277, 1278  (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) (finding that the subcontractor exception to the “your
work” exclusion in a CGL policy did not apply to general contractor’s claim against subcon-
tractor for damage done to the property while the sub-contractor performed on the general
contractor’s behalf ); Cincinnati Ins. v. Motorists Mut. Ins., 306 S.W.3d 69, 79-80 (Ky. 2010)
(finding that the general contractor’s faulty workmanship did not constitute an occurrence);
Kvaerner Metals v. Commercial Union Ins., 908 A.2d 888, 899 (Pa. 2006) (finding that the
builder’s alleged faulty workmanship could not be an occurrence since it was not an
accident).
197. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-808(1)(a)(III) (2017) (declaring that the “correct
interpretation of coverage for damages arising out of construction defects is in the best
interest of insurers, construction professionals, and property owners”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-
61-70(B)(2) (2016) (declaring coverage for “property damage or bodily injury resulting from
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Among the 17 states where the subcontractor exception issue remains
unanswered by the state supreme court, federal court, or the state legisla-
ture, states like Ohio have acknowledged these trends in their own case
law.198
E. Ohio Appellate Court Acknowledges Trend in Ohio Northern Case
After the Ohio trial court in Ohio Northern concluded the insured’s
CGL policy did not cover the subcontractor’s defective work.199  In Ohio
N. Univ. v. Charles Const. Servs., Inc., the Ohio Court of Appeals, Third
District, held that “at the very minimum” there existed an ambiguity in the
CGL policy regarding its coverage for “property damage” caused by a
subcontractor’s defective workmanship.200  Therefore, because a genuine
issue of material fact existed, the court vacated the trial court’s summary
judgment award and remanded the case for further proceedings.201
In deciding that “at the very minimum” there was an ambiguity, the
court discussed in detail its inclination to find that the CGL policy did
cover the faulty work of Charles Construction’s subcontractors.202  The
Third District started by analyzing the Ohio Supreme Court precedent set
in the Custom Agri decision.203  To determine the threshold occurrence
question, the appellate court applied the effective control test—recog-
nized in Custom Agri—of whether the contractor controlled the process
faulty workmanship, exclusive of the faulty workmanship itself”). See also Westfield Ins. Co.
v. Custom Agri. Sys., Inc., 133 Ohio St.3d 476, 2012-Ohio-4712, 979 N.E.2d 269; French v.
Assurance Co. of Am., 448 F.3d 693, 705 (4th Cir. 2006) (Finding “under Maryland law,
coverage exists under the 1986 ISO CGL Policies for the costs to remedy the damage to the
nondefective structure and walls of the Frenches’ home, unlike that of the district court and
the position of the Insurance Defendants, gives effect to the subcontractor exception to the
‘[y]our [w]ork’ exclusion in these policies”); Breezewood of Wilmington Conds.
Homeowners’ Ass’nv. Amerisure Mut. Ins., 335 Fed. Appx. 268, 278 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating
that under North Carolina law the “denied coverage was proper inasmuch as the alleged
water damage ‘arises out of’ the [general contractor’s] work within the meaning of the ‘your
work’ exclusion and is not alleged to have been performed by a subcontractor”); Fireguard
Sprinkler Sys., Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins., 864 F.2d 648, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that under
Oregon law the completed operations hazard exclusion in endorsement for broad form
property damage liability coverage did not apply to subcontractors, and the products
exclusion did not apply); Dewitt Constr., Inc. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins., 307 F.3d 1127, 1138-39
(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the subcontractor’s cost of removing and destroying non-
defective work of other subcontractors to remedy its own defective construction was covered
by the insured subcontractor’s CGL policy); Stanley Martin Cos. v. Ohio Cas. Grp., 313 Fed.
App’x. 609 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding that “any damage subcontractor’s defective work caused
to insured’s non-defective work constituted an ‘occurrence’ under commercial general
liability insurance policy, under Virginia law”).
198. See Ohio N. Univ. v. Charles Constr. Servs., Inc., 2017-Ohio-258, 77 N.E.3d 538, ¶
37 (3d Dist.).
199. See id.
200. Id. ¶ 40.
201. See id. ¶¶ 29-30.
202. See id. ¶ 41 (emphasis added).
203. See id. ¶ 10.
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leading to the damages or whether it should have anticipated them.204
The Third District Court found it persuasive that, unlike Custom Agri,
Charles Construction sought coverage for the defective work of its subcon-
tractors, not of its own.  Nevertheless, the court declined to rule on this
issue.205
The court then dissected the CGL policy.206  The following provisions
were of particular interest:
SECTION I – COVERAGE207
1. Insuring Agreement
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay
as damages because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” to which this
insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the insured
against any “suit” seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty
to defend the insured against any “suit” seeking damages for “bodily in-
jury” or “property damage” to which this insurance does not apply.
b. This insurance applies to “bodily injury” and “property damage” only if:
(1) The “bodily injury” or “property damage” is caused by an “occur-
rence” that takes place in the “coverage territory;”
* * *
SECTION V – DEFINTIONS208
* * *
16. “Occurrence” means an accident, including continuous or repeated ex-
posure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.
* * *
SECTION I – EXCLUSIONS209
* * *
This insurance does not apply to:
* * *
j. Damage to Property
“Property damage” to:
* * *
204. See id. (citing Custom Agri Sys., Inc., 133 Ohio St.3d 476, 2012-Ohio-4712, 979
N.E.2d 269) (emphasis added).
205. See id.
206. See id. ¶¶ 27-40.
207. See INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 31.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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(5) That particular part of real property on which you or any con-
tractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your be-
half are performing operations, if the “property damage” arises out
of those operations.
(6) That particular part of any property that must be restored, re-
paired or replaced because “your work” was incorrectly performed
on it.
* * *
Paragraph (6) of this exclusion does not apply to “property damage”
included in the “products-completed operations hazard.”
* * *
l. Damage to Your Work:
“Property damage” to “your work” arising out of it or any part of it
and included in the “products-completed operations hazard.”
This exclusion does not apply if the damaged work or the work out of
which the damage arises was performed on your behalf by a subcon-
tractor (emphasis added).210
The court first determined that, under Sections 1 and 16, the CGL pol-
icy covers “property damage” caused by “an occurrence.”211  Because the
court must review an entire contract to fully determine the effects of its
provisions, it moved to the policy coverage exclusions.212  While Section
“(j)(5)” appears to exclude coverage of defective work by both contractors
and subcontractors, the court interpreted the provision’s use of the present
tense (i.e., “working”) as meaning that it only applied to work in pro-
gress.213  ONU’s claim, however, arose after project completion.214
Next, the court noted that a paragraph that followed exclusion “(j)(6)”
created an exception to the exclusion that “restores [CGL] coverage if the
‘property damage’ is included in the ‘products-completed operations haz-
ard.’ ”215  Because ONU’s claim arose after project completion, the court
suggested that the products-completed operations coverage applies.216
Finally, the court indicated that exclusion “(l)” contained an exception
when the defective work was performed on the contractor’s behalf or by a
subcontractor.217  Accordingly, Charles Construction’s claim that its sub-
210. See id. ¶¶ 20-36 (citing INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 31, at 1-2, 5) (empha-
sis added).
211. See id. ¶ 41.
212. See id.
213. Id. ¶¶ 29-30.
214. See id. ¶ 25.
215. Id. ¶ 30 (citing INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 31, at 5).
216. Id. ¶ 32.
217. Id. ¶ 31.
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contractor performed the defective work seemed to operate as an excep-
tion to coverage exclusion.218
After reviewing the policy, the court cited the national trend toward
inclusion of a subcontractor’s defective work within the term “occurrence”
to trigger coverage.219  Specifically, the court cited other state supreme
court decisions in Iowa, Indiana, and West Virginia.220
In the end, the Ohio Court of Appeals, Third District, did not decide
the coverage issue or adopt the neighboring jurisdictions’ persuasive deci-
sions.221  Instead, it found that the totality of the evidence created, at min-
imum, an ambiguity as to whether the parties contracted for “property
damage” caused by subcontractor work, making it necessary to vacate the
summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.222
In April 2017, Cincinnati Insurance filed a petition to the Ohio Su-
preme Court, seeking review and reversal of the Third District’s deci-
sion.223 As of December 2017, the Ohio Supreme Court has accepted the
appeal for review.224
CONCLUSION
Courts across the country have overwhelmingly interpreted the ISO
CGL standard form as providing coverage for the defective work per-
formed by an insured’s subcontractor.  After the 1986 ISO CGL form revi-
sion, courts have recognized the exceptional nature of property damage
resulting from subcontractors’ work.  The plain and ordinary meaning of
the subcontractor exception under exclusion “(l)” clearly distinguishes
cases of an insured’s own defective work from that of its subcontractors.
Because the insured cannot realistically supervise each subcontractor at all
times, it lacks effective control and is fortuitous.  Accordingly, courts have
determined that property damage resulting from such subcontractor work
is beyond the insured’s effective control and foreseeability.
Under the prevailing case law and under the terms of the standard ISO
CGL form, courts should review questions about CGL coverage of a sub-
contractor’s defective work as follows: first, courts should presume CGL
coverage for defective work performed by the insured’s subcontractor un-
less the policy clearly excludes the specific coverage without exception;
second, that presumption might be overcome if evidence shows that the
218. See id.
219. See id. ¶ 37.
220. See id. (citing Nat’l Sur. Corp. v. Westlake Inv. LLC, 880 N.W.2d 724, 742 (Iowa
2016); Sheehan Constr. Co., Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 935 N.E.2d 160, 170 (Ind. 2010); and
Cherrington v. Erie Ins. Prop. and Cas. Co., 745 S.E.2d 508, 519 (W. Va. 2013)).
221. See id.
222. Id. ¶ 41.
223. See Notice of Appeal in re: Ohio N. Univ., Case No. 2017-0514 (Filed Apr. 17,
2017).
224. See 12/6/2017 Case Announcements, 2017-Ohio-8842.
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insured had sufficient control of the work that resulted in defective con-
struction.  Factors such as the level of the insured’s direct involvement in
conducting the work at issue and the amount of material provided directly
by the insured are potentially indicative of sufficient control.
Cases like Ohio Northern provide a clear example of how the subcon-
tractor exception has changed the analysis.  These cases provide courts,
such as the Ohio Supreme Court, with the opportunity adopt the majority
trend.
